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NOTES
PLIGHT OF THE BOAT PEOPLE: HOW TO
DETERMINE STATE OBLIGATIONS
TO ASYLUM SEEKERS
Manasi Raveendran*
INTRODUCTION
Scared, shivering, and disheveled, thousands of people float
across the Indian Ocean from Asia to reach Australia' in search of
freedom from the persecution that they face in their homes.2 After
these "boat people" land on Australian shores, they are housed in
camps, waiting for a better life. However, the same hopeful sentiment
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., Boston
University, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell for providing
the inspiration and guidance for this topic, Dean Paolo Carozza for teaching me
International Law, Sean E. Ashburn for his patience and helpful comments, the Notre
Dame Law Review, and my family and friends for supporting me and for being who
they are.
1 This Note uses the Australian example to illustrate the problems faced by both
states and asylum seekers in determining states' obligations to asylum seekers.
Although South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, and states in the
European Union have had similar problems, the Australian example has been
splashed across the pages of international newspapers for some years. The Note, how-
ever, is not restricted to addressing only the Australian situation. In fact, the analysis
of the issues in this Note can be extrapolated and applied to all states that are having
problems with an influx of refugees.
2 See Cindy Wockner & Gita Anggun Athika, Asylum Seekers Tell of Their Journey of
Death, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Oct. 20, 2010, 10:36 PM), http://www.dailytelegraph.
com.au/news/national/asylum-seekersjourney-of-death/story-e6freuzr-I 225941425
056. Refugees hailing from Afghanistan to Indonesia try to seek refuge in Australia.
Known as "boat people," these people face persecution from generalized violence,
internal strife, economic inadequacies, and repressive governments. Although some
of these "boat people" will fall within the original scope of the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, others will not. This Note focuses on those peoples that
are not "Convention refugees" but still need protection and refuge.
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is not reflected by the receiving country. For example, between 2009
and 2010 there was a thirty-one percent increase in asylum seekers in
Australia.3 As a result, Australian politics have been in turmoil, trying
to create a comprehensive policy to address the thousands of asylum
seekers that land on its shores.4
At the end of 2009, there were 43.3 million forcibly displaced
people worldwide.5 Of these, 15.2 million were refugees and, of that
number, 983,000 were asylum seekers.6 More than 922,000 individual
claims for asylum or refugee status were registered in 2009, with South
Africa receiving the world's largest number of individual applications,
followed by the United States and France.7 These refugees have
escaped political and cultural persecution for their political views, sex-
ual preference, or gender. However, when they arrive at their destina-
tion country, they face confusion and uncertainty.
Asylum seekers encounter several challenges in the current refu-
gee system. They endure protracted refugee situations,8 secondary
refugee flows,9 the extra-territorialization of migration controls,' 0 new
3 See DIVISION OF PROGRAMME SUPPORT AND MANAGEMENT, UNHCR, ASYLUM
LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2010 6 (2011) [hereinafter ASYLUM
LEVELS].
4 See Kate Gauthier, Asylum Seeker Chatter has Become a Debate About a Debate,
NATIONAL TIMEs, (July 14, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/asylum-
seeker-chatter-has-become-a-debate-about-a-debate-20110713-1hdxy.html (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
5 See DIVISION OF PROGRAMME SUPPORT AND MANAGEMENT, UNHCR, 2009 GLOBAL
TRENDS 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS].
6 See id. For an understanding of the differences in status of displaced people,
see infra Part L.A & B.
7 See id. Some refugees fall within the purview of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees [UNHCR] directly, such as Palestinian refugees, and are not
counted within the asylum seeker category. See UNHCR, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS or REFUGEES 6 (2007) [hereinafter CONVENTION AND PROTO-
COL], available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html
8 A protracted refugee situation is a situation in which asylum seekers are
trapped between the inability to return to their homes, the lack of determination of
the displaced person's status, and of the unknown actions and obligations of the state
to help these persons. Oftentimes, during a period of protracted refugee status, these
displaced persons reside in makeshift camps in border regions while waiting for their
homes to become safe or for decisions from a government body on their protection
status. See Ron Redmond, Protracted Refugee Situations: Millions Caught in Limbo, with No
Solutions in Sight, UNITED NATIONS: 10 STORIES THE WORLD SHOULD HEAR MORE
ABOUT, http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storylD= 2
6 00 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2011).
9 Secondary refugee flows are movements of refugees from the state of first entry
(also known as "safe third countries") to other states in order to receive better treat-
ment. For example, in Europe, Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain,
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forms of displacement and asylum, 1 wide discrepancies in the recog-
nition of asylum status, contraction of asylum policies and practices by
states,12 and inconsistencies in refugee status determination (RSD)
mechanisms.13
The main issue underlying all of these challenges is the problem
of, and confusion surrounding, the determination of state obligations
to asylum seekers. Human rights are indivisible and inalienable, 14 but
states have discretion in granting and providing some of these rights
to asylum seekers because no international covenant obligates them to
do so. There is no uniform system to determine the obligations that
states have to asylum seekers other than the base requirements out-
lined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
main international document on refugees. In fact, states, interna-
and Greece are the states of first entry for a large number of refugees, but these
refugees often migrate north to the Scandinavian countries that have more accommo-
dating social programs and health care options. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary
Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of
Effective Protection, UNHRC No. 2, GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS 2 (2003). But see infra Part
I.D (discussing burden-sharing problems in the European Union).
10 A state's obligation to refugees begins upon their entry into their territory.
Therefore, in order to prevent refugees from arriving onto their territory, states
expand their policing efforts to ensure that these refugees do not enter their terri-
tory. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
289-300 (2005). Australia has such a program with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Pakistan, East Timor, and Sri Lanka supplying patrol boats and other resources in
return for policing boats before they leave on their journey. See Paul Maley & Ste-
phen Fitzpatrick, Julia Gillard's Gunboat Diplomacy, THE AUSTRAIAN, (July 8, 2010,
12:00 AM) http://www.theaustralian.com.au/julia-gillards-gunboat-diplomacy/story-
fn5vfgwx-1 225889173419.
11 Examples include climate change or environmental refugees.
12 See Erika Feller, Statement by the Director, UNHCR Department of International Pro-
tection, to the 18th Meeting of the UNHCR Standing Committee (July 5, 2000) 12 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 401, 403-06 (2000) (discussing the three trends of asylum policies: (1)
very restrictive application of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, (2) alternative
protection regimes (e.g., temporary resident status), and (3) "growing impatience in
asylum countries" which leads to discrimination, nonacceptance, and increased levels
of detention).
13 See James C. Simeon, A Comparative Analysis of the Response of the UNHCR and
Industrialized States to Rapidly Fluctuating Refugee Status and Asylum Applications: Lessons
and Best Practices for RSD Systems Design and Administration, 22 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 72, 73
(2010) (footnotes not in original); see also Ninette Kelley & Jean-Francois Durieux,
UNHCR and Current Challenges in International Refugee Protection, in 22 REFUGEE 6
(2004) (reviewing the current challenges in the international refugee protection
regime).
14 See Human Rights for All, U.N. RESOURCES FOR SPEAKERS ON GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/humanrights/index.shtml (last
visited Nov. 11, 2011).
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tional organizations, and publicists1 5 differ on the methodology that
should be used to determine these obligations.
A consensus-based approach is the appropriate method of deter-
mining and expanding state obligations within the 1951 Convention.
But recent attempts to expand the rights of asylum seekers through
the new method of evolutionary interpretation of treaties could result
in an unpredictable and unwanted application of the 1951 Conven-
tion, leaving asylum seekers unsure of their rights and options. The
application of the classical tenets of customary international law to
these obligations offers a better chance of creating stability in the asy-
lum system for both asylum seekers and states. While such an
approach appears to provide less immediate relief to asylum seekers,
the consistency and stability that results from customary international
law yields benefits that outweigh the loss in immediate relief.
This Note examines how states and asylum advocates should
determine state obligations to asylum seekers, asserting that states
should expand their obligations to asylum seekers based on new
norms of customary international law. In doing so, Part I introduces
some basic refugee law concepts and discusses in detail the aforemen-
tioned challenges for states and asylum seekers. Part II outlines three
different modalities that the international community may use to
determine these obligations and asserts that applying the theory of
evolutionary interpretation of treaties to the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to Refugees is an unpredictable method of expanding state obliga-
tions to asylum seekers that fails to adequately address the problem.
Part III posits that expansion of state obligations should occur, but
under the classical international legal principle of customary interna-
tional law rather than through evolutionary interpretation of the 1951
Convention.' 6 This Note concludes with the assertion that evolution-
15 Publicists are international law scholars whose analysis of and recommenda-
tions on issues are given much weight in understanding general principles of interna-
tional law and establishing custom. See Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 38(1)(d),June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
16 In asserting that a state's asylum obligations should be expanded, this Note
inherently asserts that asylum obligations should not be constricted. The full argu-
ment of this assertion is beyond the scope of this Note. However, in brief, the argu-
ment is that there is a baseline of state obligations to asylum seekers as provided by
the 1951 Convention. Any expansion by a state of its obligations beyond the baseline
is enacted either due to domestic will or through international agreement. See infra
note 29 and accompanying text. Any contraction of state obligations is not only con-
sidered illegal, but will be devastating to current and future asylum seekers who
depend almost entirely on host states for protection and who would not be able to
seek refuge in a state that had originally provided it if contraction of these obligations
is permitted.
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ary interpretation is not an appropriate solution to the asylum seeker
problem and is undeserving of the support some scholars have given
it. The application of customary international law, on the other hand,
is a more stable method through which expansion of these obligations
should occur. The stability and consistency provided by customary
international law is the current chaotic asylum system requires rather
than the cosmetic changes evolutionary interpretation might provide.
I. BASIC REFUGEE LAW CONCEPTS
Refugee law consists of international, multilateral, and regional
treaties that are reflected in, and incorporated into, domestic policy
and law. Article 14 of the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) declares that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."' 7 The Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)' 8 as well as
the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) 19 provide the overarching principles of refugee pro-
tection. The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees chan-
neled these principles and created a framework for states to deter-
mine refugee status and implement asylum laws and procedures. 20
17 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 14, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(Ill) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
18 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRI ("Each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individ-
uals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant. . . ." (emphasis added)).
19 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 2,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCR]. The ICESCR obligates
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individu-
ally and through international assistance and co-operation, especially eco-
nomic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adop-
tion of legislative measures.
Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added). The indication that this obligation also extends to
noncitizens comes from Article 2(3) which provides a special exception for develop-
ing countries: "Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-citizens." Id. at art. 2(3).
20 See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; United
2012] 1281
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A. Who Is a Refugee?
Before World War II and the creation of the modern interna-
tional system of states, a refugee was a person who was outside her
country of origin and without the protection of that state's govern-
ment.2 1 Post-1945, after the persecution of racial and religious minor-
ities in Europe, this protection expanded to "all persons, wherever
they may be, who, as a result of events in Europe, [. . .] had to
leave ... because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of
their race, religion, or political beliefs." 22 The travaux prparatoires2 3
placed geographical and temporal limitations on those classified as
"refugees."24
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
defines a "refugee" as any person who,
owing to [the] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.25
At the time, however, there was no universal agreement on this
definition. For example, the Soviet Bloc wanted to extend the protec-
tion to people facing economic persecution. In the 1950s, individual
states began granting some protection to people fleeing from the
"economic South" (a term used to describe the poorest nations of the
world), which required material and financial assistance.26 Since the
1970s, there has been a movement to help and protect Internal and
External Displaced Persons (IDPs and EDPs) who are displaced due to
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,Jan. 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606
U.N.T.S 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
21 See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d ed.
1996).
22 See id. at 5.
23 The travaux prdparatoires or "preparatory works" are the written record of a
negotiation. The travaux are consulted in order to understand the intentions of a
treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32 May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
24 See GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 19.
25 1951 Convention, supra note 20, at art. 1(A) (2).
26 See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, Asv-
LUM 100-01 (1995).
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internal political violence and man-made disasters.27 Currently, some
states grant protection to victims of gender-based persecution, such as
victims of homophobic persecution, female genital mutilation (FGM),
and domestic violence.28
Multilateral and regional organizations have adopted their own
treaties, some of which expand the scope of "refugees" beyond the
1951 Convention.29 The Cartagena Declaration, for example,
extended the definition of refugee to include "persons who have fled
their country, because their lives, safety, or freedom have been
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal con-
flicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances seri-
ously disturbing public order."30
Individual states also expand and restrict their definitions of refu-
gees.31 When they restrict the definition of refugee to less than that
prescribed by the 1951 Convention, they violate their international
legal obligations.32 Although the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee (UNHRC) offers help in interpreting Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, the "refugee definition has been extensively interpreted by
domestic courts."33 Due to the 1951 Convention's open-ended
nature, states vary widely in the scope of protection they offer. This
Note asserts that this problem can be addressed by adopting the
method of customary international law to determine both who will
receive protection and what kinds of protection these asylum seekers
will receive.
27 See GoODwIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 264-68.
28 See infra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
29 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]; Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art. 3,
Nov. 22, 1984, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1 [hereinafter Cartagena
Declaration]; 1969 OAU Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1(2), June
20, 1974, U.N.T.S. 14, 691 [hereinafter OAU Convention].
30 See Cartagena Declaration, supra note 29. There are also "non-Convention ref-
ugees"-people who have fled war, crimes against humanity, repression, or other
human rights abuses-but are considered not to have a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. The extent of the State obligations to
these peoples is undetermined. See KAREN MusALo ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
1117 (3d ed. 2007).
31 See Sonia Boutillon, The Interpretation of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees by the European Union: Toward Harmonization, 18 GEO. IMMICR. L.J.
111, 115 (2003).
32 See id. at 113.
33 See id.
2012] 1283
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B. Who Is an Asylum Seeker and How Does One Become a Refugee?
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)
defines an asylum seeker as a person who claims that he or she is a
refugee but whose status has not yet been determined by the national
refugee determination system (RDS).34 Each state creates its own
RDS to process asylum claims.35 Regional organizations, such as the
European Union, are trying to create a uniform RDS.3 6 Generally, an
asylum seeker who migrates illegally is first detained. Then he must
34 See What is a Refugee? USA FOR UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.
unrefugees.org/site/c.lflQKSOwFqG/b.4950731/k.A894/What-isa-refugee.htm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011). For the purposes of this Note, this will be the definition
used for asylum seeker, so as to determine what obligations a state has to people that
seek asylum and do not yet have refugee status. However, there is disagreement as to
the classification of asylum seekers and refugees in this manner. Professor Hathaway
wntes:
[Some states and agreements treat] 'asylum seekers' (or 'applicants') as a
category of persons not entitled to invoke rights under the Refugee Conven-
tion. While it is true that an individual seeking recognition of refugee status
is not necessarily a refugee, it is also true that an individual is necessarily a
refugee-and hence entitled to claim the rights of refugees-prior to the
formal verification of his or her status: A person is a refugee within the
meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained
in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his
refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does
not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not
become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a
refugee.
James C. Hathaway, What's in a Label? 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 1, 9-10 (2003) (inter-
nal citations and formatting omitted) (emphasis added); see also UNHCR, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATION TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 28,
HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK).
35 In the United States there are two fora for initial determinations of refugee
status: asylum offices (for those asylum seekers who are not facing removal proceed-
ing and are filing affirmative applications for refuge) and immigration courts (for
asylum seekers facing removal and are raising their asylum claim as a defense). See
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,337 (Mar. 6,
1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1208); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2010) (outlining the
statutory scheme of these processes). Australia has a similar procedure: refugees may
apply for refugee status with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC),
whose decision may be reviewed by a Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). In certain
cases, these decisions can be reviewed by the federal court system or be challenged
with the DIAC in order to receive a permanent resident status on the basis of humani-
tarian need. See Australia's Refugee System: Facts + Stats, REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTRA-
LIA, http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/arp/facts-03.html (last visited July 31, 2011).
36 See Elizabeth Keyes, Note, Expansion and Restriction: Competing Pressures on the
United Kingdom Asylum Policy, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 395, 422-25 (2004).
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establish that he falls within the recognized refugee categories of the
1951 Convention-a person that may claim refugee status and can
"demonstrate that his [. . . ] fear of persecution in his [. . . ] home
country is well-founded."37 If the asylum seeker satisfies the national
RDS requirements, he will be granted asylum and become a refugee.
The rights granted to the refugee, such as "legal protection and mate-
rial assistance,"38 depend on domestic law.39 The 1951 Convention
grants states the discretion to determine refugee status. However, the
RDS must comport with "the principle [s] of effectiveness of obliga-
tions" as 'judged by the international standard of reasonable efficacy
and efficient implementation." 40 Additionally, the UNHCR Executive
Committee strongly recommends that asylum seekers receive due pro-
cess, including guidance to applicants, provision of competent inter-
preters, a reasonable timeline for appeals, fair and expedited judicial
processes, and independent appellate review of their cases. 41
Whether asylum seekers are actually granted due process, however, is
entirely dependent on the national RDS.
The RDS contains different categories of "refugee." The first
three categories-those persecuted on the basis of "race, religion,
[and] nationality"-are relatively easy to determine. The last cate-
gory, however, "membership of a particular social group or political
opinion," poses problems of interpretation and categorization.
"Membership of a particular social group or political opinion" is con-
sidered the catch-all group within Article 1 of the 1951 Convention.42
It offers people who did not fall within the enumerated categories
37 See What is a Refugee?, supra note 34.
38 See id.
39 In addition to the label of "refugee," states have also created several other crite-
ria for displaced people: temporary protected status, persons granted humanitarian
assistance, and persons granted a special leave to remain in the host state. These
other criteria allow states to have different levels of obligations to different peoples.
See What's in a Label?, supra note 34, at 1.
40 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 324.
41 See id.; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker's Bill of Rights in a Non-
Utopian World, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619 (2000) (discussing fair access to the refugee
determination process and the fairness of the process with the main goals of the adju-
dicative process being accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability of the process to the pub-
lic and asylum seekers). Legomsky discusses other due process provisions that he
thinks must be met at a minimum, such as pre-hearing access to counsel and evi-
dence, assistance of counsel, and cultural awareness by the adjudicators. See id. at
634-41. Due process, although defined internationally in the ICCPR Article 9, has
different tangible applications depending on the state. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art.
9. In the United States, due process reaches any "person" within the United States
and it reaches all aliens within its jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
42 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 620.
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another way to claim refugee status.43 Publicists argue that the three
enumerated characteristics of recognition under the 1951 Convention
are just defined social groups, and more social groups could be theo-
retically allowed. The UNHCR Handbook expansively defines "mem-
bership in a particular social group" as "persons of similar
background, habits or social status." 4 There is no definite, closed list
of what groups may fall within a "particular social group,"4 5 but the
UNCHR asserts that it should be interpreted in an evolutionary man-
ner in accordance with the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention.46
43 It is argued by asylum advocates that a "wide variety of cognizable groupings,
including those defined by gender, sexual identity, economic class, [or] occupation"
could fall within this category and may be granted refugee status. See id. But this
category has been subject to arbitrary interpretation. Jurisprudence is unclear about
what indicia are used to determine "membership in a particular social group,"
whether internal characteristics or external perceptions are important and the weight
of each. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecu-
tion Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 505
(1993). In Karouni v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a gay man from
Lebanon. See 399 F.3d 1163, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2005). In Matter of Acosta, the Board
of Immigration Appeals denied asylum to a Salvadoran man claiming asylum because
of his membership in a group of taxi leaders who refused to cooperate with the local
guerrilla insurgency; they cited that international law did not allow the grant of refu-
gee status to people in order to protect their ability to choose their profession (which
is not considered a human right). See 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985) availa-
ble at http://wwwjustice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol19/2986.pdf. The difference seems
to be that some groups are immutable or fundamental (such as sexual orientation
and "femaleness") but others reflect a choice that is not fundamental and is not pro-
tected (such as choice of employment). The Second Circuit in Gomez gave impor-
tance to external perceptions when it stated that a woman claiming membership in a
social group of women who were raped by guerillas was not likely to be persecuted
any more than any other women in the country, and therefore her claim was rejected
as she had presented it. See Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (1991). Gomez did
not prove that her "social group" had shared common interests, lifestyle, or back-
ground. However, how does one categorize people that are affected by environmen-
tal disasters due to their residence in a particular village? Is specific residence
considered immutable and fundamental or a choice? For different publicists that
argue that these people should fall within the Convention's definition of "refugee" via
evolutionary interpretation theory, see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
44 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 77. The Handbook relates potential
social groups to the other four categories of refugees and also discusses the internal
and external factors affecting the formation and persecution of a social group. See id.
11 77-78. It further stipulates, however, that mere membership is generally insuffi-
cient for claiming refugee status, and therefore persecution must also be proven. See
id. 79.
45 See id. 77.
46 See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: "MEMBER OF A PARTIC-
ULAR SOCIAL GROUP" WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVEN-
1286 [VOL. 87:3
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In refugee law, "persecution" is another term without concrete
definition. "There is no universally accepted definition of 'persecu-
tion,' and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met
with little success."47 Articles 31 and 33 of the 1951 Convention
describe persecution in terms of a person whose "life or freedom was
threatened."4 8 States, however, have a wide margin of appreciation49
to interpret this fundamental term. The UNHCR Handbook provi-
sions reflect the well-established rule that prosecution and punish-
ment do not fall within the confines of "persecution," meaning that
criminals fleeing legal prosecution cannot attain refugee status.50
Additionally, according to caselaw, the term "persecution" must be
interpreted in good faith. "[T]he ordinary meaning of the words of
the treaty [is] presumed to be the authentic representation of the par-
ties' intensions," and the words of the treaty must be determined
within the "context of the treaty" and its object and purpose.51
Another issue in defining "persecution" is the source of the persecu-
tion: state versus nonstate actors (individuals, private organizations,
and corporations). 52 Although the 1951 Convention does not specifi-
cally address this issue, the UNHCR Handbook states that both state
and private actors can be the source of "persecution" within the defi-
nition of the 1951 Convention.5 3
TION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, HCR/GIP/
02/02, at 2 (2002); infra Part IL.C (discussing the theory of evolutionary interpreta-
tion of treaties).
47 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 230 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra
note 34, 15).
48 See 1951 Convention, supra note 20, arts. 31, 33.
49 Margin of appreciation is a general concept in international law allowing a
range of discretion to states regarding the interpretation of a treaty and application of
it in accordance with domestic law. See, e.g., Layla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/
98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8, 1 110 (discussing the margin of appreciation granted to
France in derogating the right to manifest one's religion).
50 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 275-76 (discussing UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 34, 11 56-60).
51 See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (2000) N.Z.L.R. 545 (N.Z.), reprinted in
MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 230.
52 This discussion of the "source of persecution" is important in the later sections
of this Note that discuss how different groups of asylum seekers, who do not generally
fall within the 1951 Convention's categories of refugees, could claim refugee status. It
is particularly important for asylum seekers claiming refuge from female genital muti-
lation, domestic violence, and certain kinds of environmental persecution.
53 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 65 ("Persecution is normally related
to action by the authorities of a country. It may also emanate from sections of the
population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the country
concerned.").
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The boat people of Australia who await determination by the
national RDS fall within these gaps of 1951 Convention. For example,
they might be fleeing generalized violence from Afghanistan, environ-
mental disasters from Bangladesh, or economic misfortune from
Indonesia. As this Note later addresses, two modalities-evolutionary
interpretation and customary international law-can be used to
understand and expand the definitions of "membership in a particu-
lar social group" and "persecution" and the resulting state obligations
to these asylum seekers. The Note concludes that evolutionary inter-
pretation would not properly resolve the uncertainties surrounding
which asylum seekers will receive protection. Instead, customary
international law offers a more stable method of expansion that, while
admittedly sacrificing some measure of short-term relief, best serves
the needs of all future asylum seekers.
C. Basic Obligations to Asylum Seekers54
As a general principle of international law, states have certain
basic obligations to asylum seekers: Non-rejection, non-refoulement,55
temporary refuge, nondiscrimination, access to courts, opportunity to
find a lasting solution to their plight, and provisional admission into
the country.56 The 1976 Nansen Symposium held that "an obligation
to grant asylum, subject to certain exceptions; [required] confirma-
tion of the notion of non-rejection at the frontier within the principle
of non-refoulement, and general recognition of the principle of provi-
sional admission as a minimum requirement."57
Australia is one state that satisfies these minimum requirements.
Australia tries to prevent asylum seekers from landing on its shores,
but once they have arrived, Australia does not reject them, it does not
try to return them to their home countries, and it does allow them
provisional admission until the asylum seekers have undergone the
national RDS. In addition to non-refoulement and provisional admis-
54 For clarification purposes, this Note analyzes the obligations that states have to
asylum seekers, not people that have gone through the RDS and have been
determined to be, or not be, refugees.
55 The principle of non-refoulement is the obligation by the host state to not expel
or return ("refouler") "a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
natienality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 20, art. 33; see also I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) (hold-
ing that the non-refoulement principle was only guaranteed to those asylum seekers who
could demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution").
56 See 1951 Convention, supra note 20, arts. 3, 16, 32, 33.
57 GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 181 (second emphasis added).
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sion, Australia provides some minimal monetary, medical, and legal
aid for the asylum seekers within its borders.58 However, tents of asy-
lum seekers wait in an asylum limbo of detention59 until the state's
RDS determines the appropriate action for persons that do not fall
within the traditional Convention definition of "refugee." Some of
the asylum seekers in Australia have been waiting for adjudication and
determination of their refugee status from anywhere between three
and eleven years.6 0
58 See Fact Sheet 62: Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Australia, AusTL. Gov'T, DEP'T OF
IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/62assis-
tance.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011); Fact Sheet 63: Immigration Advice and Application
Assistance Scheme, AuSTL. Gov'T, DEP'T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, http://www.
immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/63advice.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (discussing
specific requirements that are needed in order to be entitled to these benefits).
59 The method of seeking asylum discussed here, which includes detention, is for
asylum seekers that enter states without proper travel documentation. Asylum seekers
can gain asylum and refugee status through other channels, such as applying from the
asylum seeker's home state or by first traveling to the host state with proper travel
documentation on other terms (e.g., through the regular travel or work visa process)
and requesting permanent or semi-permanent refugee status after entry. An interest-
ing examination of Article 31 of the 1951 Convention provides that asylum seekers
should not be penalized for illegal immigration-like situations because they were flee-
ing from persecution. But the current asylum scene shows that they are in fact treated
like illegal persons and kept in detention facilities. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Interna-
tional Law and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 193,
208 (1986). "In 1999 [the] UNHCR issued guidance on the detention of asylum-
seekers, recommending that detention should be the exception, rather than the rule,
and that it should be used only in specified and limited circumstances." MusALO ET
AL., supra note 30, at 959 (citing UNHCR, DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
SERVICES, ALTERNATIVES To DETENTION OF AsYLuM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES, POLAS/
2006/03 (April 2006)). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees outlines that (1)
detention is highly undesirable, (2) it must only be resorted to in cases of necessity,
and (3) should not be automatically applied to people that come "directly" in an
irregular manner. See UNHCR, UNHCR REVISED GUIDELINES ON APPLICABLE CRITERIA
AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF AsYLUM-SEEKERS, Introduction 1-3
(1999) [hereinafter UNHCR REVISED GUIDELINES]. This document also offers alterna-
tives to detention, such as monitoring protocols, residence requirements, guarantors,
bail systems, or specially designed residence centers. See id. at Guideline 4. The term
"necessary" is defined as it pertains to reasons why states may be able to detain certain
asylum seekers. See UNHCR, DETENTION OF REFUGEES AND AsyLUM SEEKERS, CONCLU-
SION No. 44 (XXXVII) (Oct. 13, 1986).
60 See End to Refugee Detention, 16 AusT. NURSINcJ. 13 (2008). Just like all other
aspects of asylum law practice, detention practices are quite varied. Australia and the
United States detain asylum seekers during the entire RDS process whereas European
states have much more limited detention periods (between one to three months). See
MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 959.
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While these asylum seekers are in a state of limbo, they deserve
their basic, non-derogable human rights6 1-namely, the right to life,
the right to be free from slavery, the right to be free from torture, and
the rights to be free from retroactive application of penal laws. 6 2
Other human rights also apply to these asylum seekers: the right to be
free from arbitrary detention,63 "recognition as a person before the
law, equality before and equal protection of the law, [and the] free-
dom of conscience, thought, and religion."64 Going further, domestic
and international human rights advocates argue that these detainees
should be allocated even more rights and freedoms, such as employ-
ment rights and full access to state-sponsored social services.65 Even if
asylum seekers receive these "extra" rights, they continue to live in
limbo, not understanding or realizing the full breadth of their rights
in the host state. There are few options available for such asylum seek-
ers. They must either wait until the current host state has the political
will to expand its understanding of "refugee" and grant protection to
more asylum seekers, or they must seek refuge elsewhere.66
61 Non-derogable rights are ones that cannot be limited under any circum-
stances. There are also derogable rights, such as the right to religious manifestation
and the freedom of movement which may be limited by states for purposes of public
order, safety, health, or the protection of the freedoms and rights of others. See
ICCPR, supra note 18, at art. 4. Many states have actually entered reservations to
Article 26 of the 1951 Convention, which concerns the freedom of movement, in
order to ensure that these states may restrict places of residence of asylum seekers "on
the grounds of national security, public order, or the public interest." Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 59, at 206.
62 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 59, at 205.
63 Although the UNHCR urges states to refrain from detaining asylum seekers at
all, it is generally accepted that states can detain asylum seekers for the purposes of
initial determination or later for purposes of national security. See UNHCR REVISED
GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at Guideline 10. Protracted or arbitrary detention, how-
ever, is prohibited. See id.
64 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 59, at 205.
65 See, e.g., End to Refugee Detention, supra note 60. The UNHCR provides condi-
tions for detention, such as the opportunity to receive medical treatment, education,
vocational training in addition to basic necessities, and basic human rights (such as
exercise of religion and due process). This guideline does not include the right to
work or access to state-sponsored social services. See UNHCR, REVISED GUIDELINES,
supra note 59, at Guideline 10.
66 In some regions, such as the European Union, where the first-entry policy is in
effect as well as relatively uniform definitions of "refugee," if an asylum seeker fails to
pass through the first-entry state's RDS, they might not have the ability to find
another, nearby state where they can try again. As mentioned earlier, although the
first-entry policy allows states to avoid forum shopping and promote burden sharing,
it really negatively affects asylum seekers.
[VOL. 87:31290
PLIGHT OF THE BOAT PEOPLE
Several factors restrict the protection states provide to asylum
seekers, including xenophobia; strict interpretation of domestic refu-
gee laws; high burdens of proof for granting refugee status; considera-
ble difficulties for asylum seekers to establish "well-founded fear" due
to lack of documentation or problems in understanding the asylum
process; and the lack of efficient, stream-lined procedures in the
RDS. 6 7 Additionally, states face incredible pressures from domestic
groups that argue that national resources should go towards domestic
problems and the citizenry rather than to foreigners and asylum seek-
ers. Understandably, states have to balance the needs of their domes-
tic population with those of asylum seekers. Especially in difficult
economic times, countries focus on providing for their own citizenry.
Countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain receive large numbers of
asylum seekers from the African continent and the Middle East.
These countries are also experiencing terrible economic turmoil, as
reflected by the recent Greek debt crisis.68 Spain, in order to handle
their domestic asylum seeker and migrant problem,69 initiated two
programs: a regulaizaci6n program and a "Plan de Retorno
Voluntario," which provided amnesty and voluntary return to illegal
immigrants, including asylum seekers.70  The Spanish voluntary
return program and the Australian policy of immigration controls are
attempts to systematically turn away asylum seekers.
As the story of the boat people reflects, asylum seekers are inher-
ently marginalized populations that have been abandoned by their
countries and need the protection of other states. States are the sole
entities in the international community that are capable of providing
this protection. All individuals, including asylum seekers, inherently
possess indivisible human rights. So states should not treat asylum
67 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 59, at 194. There are also discrepancies within a
host state's system of civic detention of asylum seekers, for example giving preferen-
tial treatment to asylum seekers from one country. See id. at 203.
68 See Greek Debt Crisis Still Unresolved, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Greek-Debt-Crisis-Still-Unresolved-
130560808.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
69 In 2005, Spain hosted 1,714,256 undocumented persons out of a total popula-
tion of 43 million. See Francisco Torres, La Regularizacidn Extraordinaria: Luces y Som-
bras [Extraordinary Regulation: Lights and Shadows], PENSAMIENTO CRITICO, (une
2005) http://www.pensamientocritico.org/frantor0605.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2011).
70 See Maria Pab6n L6pez, What Nations Are Doing About Immigrant Workers In
Downturn Economies: Examining and Comparing the Recent Treatment of Immigrant Workers
in the United States and Spain, I NOTRE DAMEJ. INT'L, CoMP. & Hum. RTs. L. 80, 87-92
(2011), available at http://www.nd.edu/-intlaw/Lopez%20Article.pdf (discussing the
Spanish regularization program).
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seekers as second-class, "illegal" persons for unlawfully crossing the
border, but afford them basic rights to allow them to live a dignified
life, such as the right to a family life, a form of employment, and basic
health and safety rights. States should consider programs similar to
the Spanish amnesty program, which provided some relief to desper-
ate asylum seekers. Human rights, such as those requested by asylum
seekers, are basic rights, which do not diminish when the economy
contracts or domestic politics change. This Note suggests that by
expanding state obligations to asylum seekers through customary
international law, asylum seekers' basic human rights will not be sus-
ceptible to the ebbs and flows of internal state concerns.
D. Problems in Refugee Law
The various definitions of "refugee" and interpretations of state
obligations to asylum seekers lead to several challenges for states, asy-
lum seekers, and the international community. First, there is a lack of
concrete, statutory definitions of "refugee," either in international
documents or domestic law. The history of refugee law "illustrate [s]
both the development in the refugee definition and the problems that
arise in applying it consistently to large numbers of asylum seekers."71
"States have translated their concern for the international problem of
refugees into action on the municipal level."72 These municipal
actions, however, are too disjointed to provide a sufficiently consistent
practice that benefits asylum seekers.
Second, states have differing obligations asylum seekers. "l[T] here
is a clear gap between what may be called functional responsibilities
and expectations, on the one hand, and the legal obligations of States,
on the other hand."73 These differing obligations either go beyond
those outlined in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol or fall short
due to states' reservations74 to these documents.
Lastly, existing obligations are not truly enforced. The UNHCR
has been tasked this responsibility, but its ability to tangibly affect state
obligations and practices is limited.75 Furthermore, "the majority of
States clearly want the United Nations to assume responsibilities for a
71 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 13.
72 Id. at 25. By "municipal" it is meant that domestic and local courts, panels, and
tribunals are the final arbiters of asylum determinations.
73 Id. at 26.
74 A reservation is a caveat to a state's acceptance of a treaty. It allows a state to
be a party to the treat, but excludes the legal obligation of a specific part of the treaty
to which the state has objected. See VCLT, supra note 23, art. 2(1)(d).
75 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Margin of Interpretation: Different or Disparate?, 11
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 730, 730 (1999). For a view on who should oversee the 1951
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broad category of persons obliged to flee their countries for a variety
of reasons."7 6 But the international community lacks the social cohe-
sion and political will to expand asylum obligations and to enforce
them.
These three challenges are problematic to states, asylum seekers,
and the international asylum mechanism. Due to different state poli-
cies, refugees are confused about where they might actually receive
protection. States are afraid that refugees will "engage in forum-shop-
ping between different jurisdictions,"" meaning that refugees will go
to states with favorable refugee and asylum laws in order to reap bene-
fits and perhaps later move to the country in which they actually want
to live.78 In response to forum shopping and to control refugee move-
ment, European Union states have enacted laws that restrict where
refugees need to file their claims, rather than establishing consistent
regional refugee policies. Refugees must claim refugee status in the
state of first entry.79 States argue that the first-entry policy is a good
way to ensure burden sharing8 o of asylum seekers and eliminate the
refugees' abuse of the system. There is no proof, however, that this
type of procedural restraint actually alleviates burden-sharing
problems, especially because states have little control over how asylum
seekers choose their destination.8 1 For example, due to the geo-
graphic and historical contours of Europe, states such as Spain, Italy,
and Greece receive more refugees than other European countries.
Due to the state of first entry policy, these states have to accommodate
larger refugee populations than their northern neighbors. Conse-
quently, there is no real burden sharing or alleviation of the burden
for these border states. At the same time, the policy of first entry
makes it more difficult for the asylum seekers at the outset to deter-
mine their preferred location and pressures them to take considera-
Refugee Convention, see James C. Hathaway, Who Should Watch Over Refugee Law? 14
FORCED MICRATION REv. 393, 398-99 (2002).
76 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 25.
77 Boutillon, supra note 30, at 117.
78 See id.
79 See id. The state of first entry is literally the state that the refugee first enters
after fleeing his home country. The European Union had enacted such policies
where asylum seekers had to file claims for refugee status in the state of first entry via
the Dublin Convention. See id.
80 Burden sharing is a concept that one country should not host more refugees
than its fair share in comparison to other countries. See id. at 117 n.23.
81 See id. at 117. In addition to choosing a state for their refugee laws and social
services, asylum seekers must also compare the risks that they must take in order to
reach a destination with the chances that they will actually arrive there and be granted
the protection that they need and require.
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ble risks to arrive in their preferred country if it is one that is not easily
accessible.82
After these (illegal immigrant) asylum seekers finally arrive at a
host state, they still face problems in obtaining refugee status and real-
izing the rights associated with that status. Receiving tangible results
from the national RDS requires the political will of the host state, but
that can be quite elusive. Moreover, states have different national
RDS and varied obligations that constitute the current haphazard asy-
lum system.
II. DIFFERENT MODALITIES OF DETERMINING STATE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER REFUGEE LAW
In order to achieve a stable and liberal regime of rights for asy-
lum seekers, there must be an established method to determine states'
obligations. Legal scholars have posited three methods to determine
state obligations to asylum seekers: (1) a strict, positivist view of state
obligations, (2) a liberal view that allows a variety of state obligations
depending on states' political will, and (3) a view that espouses inter-
national expansion of new state obligations based on the application
of the theory of evolutionary interpretation to the 1951 Convention.
None of the modalities presented here are viable for appropriately
expanding states' obligations to asylum seekers. Instead, customary
international law provides an alternative, more stable method for
expanding obligations.
A. The Positivist View
Theorists espousing the positivist, or the strict, narrow view on
state obligations encourage the limitation of obligations to the Con-
vention's text. "[T]hose universal rights of particular value to refu-
gees, even as it explains why the rights of refugees are, for the most
part, best defended not by reference to universal custom or general
principles of law, but by reliance on clear duties codified in treaty
law."8 3 Some publicists argue that the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Pro-
tocol, and the surrounding Guidelines should be the sole source of
state obligations to asylum seekers.84
The Convention and Protocol definitions, however, are neither
clear nor comprehensive enough for international human rights and
humanitarian needs. The "boat people" in Australia are illegal immi-
82 See id. at 118.
83 See HATHAWAY, supra note 10, at 10.
84 See id. at 74. Hathaway asserts that the existing refugee rights regime is suffi-
cient for addressing the crises in refugee law today. See id. at 1002.
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grant asylum seekers that have been detained for long periods with no
relief. They are fleeing generalized violence, internal conflicts, gross
violations of human rights, or severe economic hardship. Those "per-
secutions" are generally not classified under the 1951 Convention, so
these asylum seekers are considered "non-Convention refugees."
Although they do not have a legally recognized refugee status under
the 1951 Convention, these people have dire needs that must be met
by the asylum system tasked to protect them. The asylum system
places a heavy burden on states. They must employ immigration
officers, finance overhead costs, and maintain detention centers.
However, states are the only viable entities that can provide the pro-
tection sought by asylum seekers, and they must be obligated to do so.
In fact, if states expand asylum obligations through customary interna-
tional law, it will result in a unified system that will inherently alleviate
burden-sharing problems. For example, if all states are providing the
same obligations, it would reduce forum shopping by asylum seekers
and states would not have to spend as many resources trying to control
asylum seekers' entry and movement.85
B. States' Self-Appointed Obligations
The second modality allows states to determine their own obliga-
tions beyond the Convention and Protocol, giving great weight to the
principle of margin of appreciation.8 6 Liberal allowance to states over
certain "legislative" asylum issues, such as RDS procedures and what
kinds of asylum seekers are granted refugee status, can result in exper-
imentation and perhaps liberalization and expansion of asylum laws
and obligations as per the needs of the international community.87
States with resource capabilities and political willingness have histori-
cally expanded their obligations. For example, the United States
expanded its understanding of "refugee" to include refugees from the
Eastern Bloc and Cuba during the Cold War, labeling them victims of
"economic persecution."88
Under this modality, "[t]he acceptance of other foreigners for
humanitarian reasons would be based, not on any Convention obliga-
tion, but on considerations of humanitarian law or international soli-
85 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
87 In the United States as well as other common law countries judges are another
factor in determining what peoples are granted refugee status.
88 See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing Kovac v. LN.S.). Prefer-
ential treatment has also been given to Cuban refugees since the 1960s. They arrive
for mostly economic reasons, but it is characterized as per se political persecution by
the Communist Castro government.
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darity; that is 'on a free decision by the State concerned. "'8 9 Moore,
offering a state-centric point of view of international legal theory,
argues that the right to grant asylum "is to be exercised by the govern-
ment in the light of its own interests, and of its obligations as a repre-
sentative of social order."90 Even the UN Group of Experts agrees:
"[E]ach Contracting State, acting in the exercise of its sovereign fights,
shall use its best endeavours in a humanitarian spirit to grant asylum in
its territory.' "91 This modality asserts that the 1951 Convention acts as
a baseline for state obligations from which individual states may devi-
ate due to domestic political will and resource capabilities.
Determining state obligations in this way leaves refugees suscepti-
ble to the pendulum swings of domestic popularity of policies, compo-
sition of legislatures, availability of resources, and compilation of the
judiciary or administration system that decides such issues.9 2 For
example, the nontraditional areas into which asylum coverage is
expanding in individual countries, such as gender- and sex-based refu-
gees and environmental refugees, are ones that are more difficult to
decide objectively on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult to determine
whether these persons actually fit within the category of "membership
of a particular social group or political opinion" or if there is a "well-
founded fear of persecution."93
This difficulty in determination and execution leads to problems
for states as well. For example, it could lead to excessive fraudulent
claims, which clutter the already overworked national RDS.94 Addi-
tionally, drastic changes, specifically restrictions, in the asylum laws of
individual countries can have serious effects on other states. It can
result in overwhelming the administrative systems of neighboring
states and mass influxes of asylum seekers traveling to more favorable
host states.95 In Europe, for example, the Scandinavian countries pro-
vide more social benefits to asylum seekers than their Southern Euro-
pean counterparts, so asylum seekers try to arrive in these favorable
states. It is exactly for this reason (forum shopping) that the Euro-
89 GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 27 (emphasis added).
90 See id. at 172-73.
91 See id. at 180.
92 See, e.g., Keyes, supra note 36, at 401-04 (discussing the aforementioned issues
as well as external pressures from the European Union in the determination of asy-
lum policy in the United Kingdom).
93 See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
94 Actually assessing whether a woman is a domestic violence victim or if a person
comes from a village that has been destroyed by manmade environmental disasters is
quite difficult. Evidence gathering and witness production is very difficult to provide
for the victims and to authenticate by local judges.
95 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 194-95.
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pean community enacted the first-entry policy, but that rule has result-
ing practical problems, as well.96 States, such as Australia, are
understandably confused, overwhelmed, and frustrated by the asylum
system and by the large numbers of asylum seekers that arrive at their
borders.
This modality of interpretation relies heavily on the consent of
states to determine their own obligations, similar to customary inter-
national law. However, unlike customary international law, these obli-
gations are not determined uniformly with the consensus of several
states. By using this modality to determine obligations, the asylum sys-
tem will remain susceptible to the ebb and flow of domestic policies.
Therefore, creating a stable mechanism for expanding state obliga-
tions to asylum seekers via custom would benefit both states and asy-
lum seekers.
C. Evolutionary Interpretation of the 1951 Convention
1. Synopsis of the Modality
The third modality asserts that expansions of asylum law and state
obligations to asylum seekers should be based on an evolutionary
interpretation of the 1951 Convention. Before discussing evolution-
ary interpretation, this Note briefly discusses customary international
law (CIL) in order to contrast it with evolutionary interpretation as an
alternative to CIL. Part III addresses CIL more fully.9 7
The UNHCR Programme stated that "refugee problems are the
concern of the international community and their resolution is
dependent on the will and capacity of states to respond in concert and
wholeheartedly, in a spirit of true humanitarianism and international
solidarity."9 8 The international community has created a system for
refugees, and as such, expansions in state obligations to these people
that have been granted special status must also be derived from the
international community. "'Community rules should lead to a com-
96 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
97 See infra Part III.
98 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 26, at 29 (emphasis added); see also IOM & UNHRC,
Towards a Comprehensive Regional Policy Approach: The Case for Closer Inter-Agency Co-opera-
tion, 5 INT'L. J. REFUGEE L. 347, 382-86 (1993) (proposing a regional policy based
approach to the problems that states face in controlling population movements); Guy
S. Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and Responsibility in the Twenty-first Century: More Lessons
Learned from the South Pacific, 12 PAC. Rim L. & POL'YJ. 23, 35 (2003) (discussing the
MV/ Tampa incident and using it as a case study to assess the obligations that states
should have towards refugees).
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mon asylum procedure and a uniform status. . .. ' "99 Therefore, creating
a comprehensive and liberal scheme of state obligations should result
from a community of states. This comprehensive scheme is known as
a new custom in international law.
In order to assert a new norm of customary international law,
there must be general practice of states and opiniojuris.100 Opiniojuris
(an "opinion of law") is the belief that an action or a law or a judg-
ment was enacted because it was a legal obligation. It is the subjective
element of custom as a source of international and domestic law. 101
The objective element is the general practice of states. According to
Kay Hailbronner, there is neither extensive and uniform state practice
nor opinio juris sufficient to warrant an assertion of international
rights for refugees outside the scope of the Convention. 102 These two
requirements are quite difficult to find in practice due to the current
state of affairs in refugee law. Because of the ad hoc, state-driven asy-
lum system, there is no uniform practice of states' obligations towards
asylum seekers. Additionally, the determination of opinio juris, which
is normally difficult, is even more difficult because drafting domestic
immigration policies is highly political.0 3  Publicists argue that in
order to arrive at an international consensus of state obligations
regarding asylum seekers while avoiding lengthy negotiations for
another refugee treaty,104 one must interpret the treaty in an evolu-
99 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 75, at 735 (emphasis added) (quoting Tampere Euro-
pean Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 738 (1999)). Although in
this case the author was specifically discussing the European Union and its commu-
nity of rules towards asylum seekers, the communitarian sentiment is still valid.
100 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-12 (7th ed.
2008).
101 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 28 (Sept.
7); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 78
(Feb. 20); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, 1 68 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.
pdf (applying the concept of opinio juris in three different cases to discern whether a
new custom of international law had been formed).
102 SeeJames C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 25 (1991) (citing Kay Hail-
bronner, Non-refoulement and 'Humanitarian' Refugees: Customary International Law or
Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 887 (1986)).
103 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. This assertion simply highlights
that opinio juris is based on the legal obligations of states. The crux of domestic immi-
gration policies is highly dependent on politics rather than on law. The reasoning of
the political branches of governments only can be used to show opinio juris if it is
reflective of legal obligations.
104 Regional harmonization and expansion of asylum obligations has been sought
by the European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organi-
zation for African Unity (OAU). The OAS and the OAU have regional treaties that
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tionary manner to fulfill the object and purpose of the 1951 Conven-
tion. Evolutionary interpretation is the judicial reading-in of the
diverse obligations that have, arguably, come within the Convention
over time.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) governs
the interpretation of international conventions.105 Articles 31 and 32
of the VCLT offer general and supplementary rules of interpretation,
respectively. Article 31(3) (c)1 0 6 allows for a "scope of evolutionary
interpretation by reference to developments in the law outside the
immediate confines of a particular treaty."107 Examples of evolution-
ary treaty interpretation can be seen in the "expansion of interna-
tional law into regulation of new areas, particularly by treaties not only
creating specific obligations but also establishing general principles."1 08
The evolutionary interpretation theory is built upon the premise
that "changed circumstances affect [the] interpretation of a treaty."109
Tribunals use evolutionary interpretation to read something into a
treaty due to changes over time. Tribunals have found that using evo-
lutionary interpretation "ensure[s] an application of the treaty that
would be effective in terms of its object and purpose" and that such an
application would be preferred to a strict application of the treaty
without considering temporal changes.110 The Permanent Court of
expand upon the 1951 Convention. See supra notes 29-30. The EU's Tampere Con-
clusion and the Hague Program go further by seeking to create a harmonized system
of RSD and asylum laws under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). See
Protection in Europe, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, http://www.ecre.
org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
105 See VCLT, supra note 23, art. 31.
106 Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT states that "there shall be taken into account,
together with the context: . . . any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." Id. art. 31(3) (c).
107 RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREAYr INTERPRETATION 252 (2008).
108 Id. (emphasis added).
109 Id.; see also Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua), July 13, 2009, 48 I.L.M. 1180, 1 64 ("On the one hand, the subsequent
practice of the parties, within the meaning of Article 31(3) (b) of the Vienna Conven-
tion, can result in a departure from the original intent on the basis of a tacit agreement between
the parties. On the other hand, there are situations in which the parties' intent upon
conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used
or some of them a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all,
so as to make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.
In such instances it is indeed in order to respect the parties' common intention at the
time the treaty was concluded, not to depart from it, that account should be taken of
the meaning acquired by the terms in question upon each occasion on which the treaty is
to be applied." (emphasis added)).
110 GARDINER, supra note 107, at 255.
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Arbitration (PCA) used evolutionary treaty interpretation in Iron
Rhine Railway."' This case extended the term "new road" or "new
canal" in Article XII of the 1839 treaty in issue to refer to a railway.112
The PCA stated that an evolutionary interpretation is superior to a
strict application in order to address new technological railway devel-
opments. It also considered the object and purpose of the treaty,
which addressed the cost and expenses of the modernization and
extension of other methods of transport." 3 Similarly, environmental
treaties have also been subjected to evolutionary interpretation in
order to accommodate new threats and new technologies, as exempli-
fied by the Shrimp-Turtle case.1 4 Regional trade treaties, such as the
treaty in dispute in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, have also been subject to
evolutionary interpretation.15
The 1951 Convention is a special kind of treaty-document, a
human rights treaty, that provides safe haven to the peoples of the
111 Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine ("Ijzeren Rijn") Railway (Belgium v.
Netherlands), May 24, 2005, 27 R.I.A.A. 35 (2005), available at http://untreaty.un.
org/cod/riaa/cases/volXXVII/35-125.pdf.
112 See id. 1 79.
113 See id. at 57, 71.
114 In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate
Body interpreted Article XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
(1994) under the principles of Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT and, by considering the
object and purpose of the chapeaux (rather than the object and purpose of the whole
treaty), allowed the United States to deviate from the GATT to ensure the protection
of shrimp species. The protection of this species had not been considered at the
treaty's inception, but the chapeaux provided for such future considerations. See
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 158 n.157, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998). A chapeaux is the head para-
graph of a separate section of a treaty. It sets the tone, object, and purpose of that
particular section, which may vary slightly from the overall object and purpose of the
treaty.
115 See Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights,July 13, 2009, 48 I.L.M.
1180. The parties challenged the meaning of the phrase "con objetos de comerico"
(literally translated as "with objects of commerce") in Article VI of the 1858 Treaty of
Limits. See id. 37. Costa Rica asserted a broad interpretation-taking the phrase to
mean "for the purpose of commerce"-which would include not only the transporta-
tion of goods, but also people. Id. 1 45. Nicaragua, on the other hand, interpreted
the phrase strictly to mean "with articles of trade." Id. The ICJ found that Costa Rica
has the right of free navigation on the San Juan River for purposes of commerce,
including the transport of peoples. It based its decision on an evolutive understand-
ing of the treaty to include temporal changes in the definition of "commerce."
"[T]he term 'comercio,' must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each
occasion on which the Treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original mean-
ing ... it is the present meaning which must be accepted for purposes of applying the
Treaty." Id. 70.
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international community from violence and discrimination. Publicists
posit that the Asylum Convention needs a more natural evolution of
the interpretation of the object and purpose of Article 1 to develop a
more comprehensive definition of the term "refugee."116
In general, the 1951 Convention's meaning has evolved. For
example, Article 1 still asserts a limited scope of application to those
people who became refugees as a result of events occurring prior to
January 1, 1951.117 The Convention's definition of "refugee," how-
ever, has expanded to apply even to people who became refugees
after that date"s because states failed to adhere to that temporal
requirement.119 Similarly, the terms "membership in a particular
social, group" and "persecution" have expanded over time to include
more groups that would not have originally received protection under
the 1951 Convention.120 For example, gender-based asylum seekers
or those fleeing generalized violence have been recognized as refu-
gees by asylum-receiving countries. 121
Further application of evolutionary treaty interpretation would
allow for an expansion of the categories of "refugee" in the 1951 Con-
vention to encompass more kinds of asylum seekers, liberalizing the
regime to include asylum seekers such as. some of the Australian boat
people. Arguably, evolutionary interpretation should be applied to
the two contested clauses in the 1951 Convention: "[A] member of a
social group"l 22 and "persecution."12 3 Publicists contend that evolu-
tionary interpretation should be applied to the 1951 Convention defi-
nition of "refugee" to expand its protection of "non-Convention"
asylum seekers. 124 One publicist proposes that victims of private, man-
116 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
117 See 1951 Convention, supra note 20, art. 1
118 See UNHCR CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at 6.
119 Failure to adhere to a custom or a treaty in turn becomes a custom on its own
merits. In this case, the custom of failing to adhere to the temporal requirement of
the 1951 Convention became its own custom and was later codified in the 1967
Protocol.
120 See infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
121 See id.
122 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., Larry Katzman, UNHCR's Asylum-Related Guidelines 81 No. 17 INTER-
PRETER RELEASEs 545, 547-48 (2004) (suggesting that the UNHCR's Executive Com-
mittee (ExCom) Conclusions, which seeks to interpret the 1951 Convention in
"evolutionary" terms, should act as formally binding interpretations for the asylum
regime); justice A.M. North & Nehal Bhuta, The Future of Protection: The Role of the
judge, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 491 (2001) (discussing the inability of a "state-centric"
interpretation to adequately protect refugees).
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made environmental harm-such as indigenous peoples in Bolivia
and El Salvador victimized by environmental degradation as a result of
unsafe mining and extraction practices-should be considered part of
the 1951 Convention through the theory of evolutionary interpreta-
tion. 125 Marcs argues that these peoples belong to a particular "social
group" of indigenous peoples who own land that is particularly attrac-
tive to mining companies. Therefore, they face a "well-founded fear
of persecution" from a nonstate actor because of continued environ-
mental calamities caused by pollutants and destruction of their land,
which is their sole livelihood.'2 6
2. An Assessment of the Theory of Evolutionary Interpretation
This third modality seeks to reach a compromise between the
other two. It allows for the expansion of state obligations from the
limited allocations of the 1951 Convention while providing some sem-
blance of harmony in the incorporation of new obligations within the
scope of the Convention. This consensus-based expansion benefits
refugees by designating a baseline for state obligations that is higher
than the status quo, meaning that it could allow for a liberalized asy-
lum system to accommodate asylum seekers such as the Australian
boat people. It benefits states by reducing the burden-sharing
problems, and it benefits the domestic courts by reducing the confu-
sion when applying international and comparative legal standards.
However, evolutionary interpretation poses two main problems:
international recognition and legal validity. Generally, the Asylum
Convention, as with all other treaties, is interpreted with two main
policies in mind: (1) to ensure states' consent and (2) to enable the
widest participation possible. For this reason, the 1951 Convention
grants states the ability to fluctuate their obligations based on domes-
tic policy and political will.12 7 This is the concept of "margin of appre-
ciation" expounded earlier. Although it is of vital and moral
importance that states grant protection to asylum seekers, the Asylum
Convention is a treaty that imposes hefty obligations upon a state and
its domestic policies-arguably more obligations than any other
human rights treaty.128
125 See Carly Marcs, Spoiling Movi's River: Towards Recognition of Persecutory Environ-
mental Harm Within the Meaning of the Refugee Convention, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 31,
34-35 (2008).
126 See id. at 35, 43, 63.
127 See 1951 Convention, supra note 20, pmbl., cl. 5.
128 See id. pmbl., cl. 4; see also supra notes 74-77, 89-90 and accompanying text
(discussing the burdens on states).
[VOL. 87:31302
PLIGHT OF THE BOAT PEOPLE
Due to the high level of obligations already imposed by this
treaty, it is a legitimate concern that states should have the freedom to
create the mechanisms and execute the enforcement of their asylum
obligations. It is the very freedom and discretion granted to states by
the 1951 Convention that makes it a widely accepted treaty. As of
April 1, 2011, there were 142 states party to both the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol.129 The proliferation of the Asylum Conven-
tion is paramount, and more comprehensive acceptance of the
remaining states requires a state-minded understanding and interpre-
tation of the 1951 Convention. Evolutionary interpretation incorpo-
rates new obligations as a result of judicial interpretation, inherently
invalidating states' ability to choose their asylum obligations.
Another problem with the evolutionary interpretation of the Asy-
lum Convention is the degradation of the treaty. The treaty is one of
the most important vehicles of international law.o30 It constitutes a
legal, binding obligation based on consent and enforceable by inter-
national institutions.' 3 Scholars stipulate that the use of evolutionary
interpretation is just for that purpose, "to further the process of inter-
pretation, not to displace the treaty."' 3 2 If the theory of evolutionary
interpretation may be used to create a new definition of refugee, it
results in a defacto amendment of the treaty, thereby deteriorating the
structures of the treaty regime. The VCLT outlines the methodology
for amendments and changes to a treaty. 133 Article 31(3) (c) was not
contemplated as a venue for amendments, but rather as a method of
interpretation that ensures the continuation of the treaty's object and
purpose over time.
Additionally, the use of evolutionary interpretation to change the
definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention would result in a com-
pletely new interpretation of the treaty that was perhaps not contem-
129 See UNHCR, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STA-
TUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pro-
tect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). There are three
states that are only party to the Convention and three states that are only party to the
Protocol, the United States being one of them. See id. There are 193 countries recog-
nized by the United Nations today. See What are Member States?, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/whatisms.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
130 See VCLT, supra note 23, pmbl, cl. 2 ("Recognizing the ever-increasing impor-
tance of treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing peace-
ful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional and social systems.").
131 The ICJ has the ability to hear cases on treaties, referring to treaties, and apply-
ing treaties in order to adjudicate international disputes. See ICJ Statute, supra note
15, arts. 36-38.
132 GARDINER, supra note 107, at 252.
133 See VCLT, supra note 23, arts. 39-41.
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plated or, more importantly, contemplated and rejected. For
example, during the early 1990s, due to the fall of the Soviet bloc,
there was an influx of people from Eastern Europe into Western
Europe and the United States. These Cold War asylum seekers
claimed refugee status under the 1951 Convention's "membership in
a social group." The United States, in the midst of Cold War political
maneuvering, further changed the definition of "persecution" via
interpretation in Djordje Kovac v. LN.S. to include nonphysical perse-
cution such as the deprivation of economic opportunities so that
these Eastern European asylum seekers would not be deported. 3 4
However, economic oppression is not enumerated in the U.S. Refu-
gee Act of 1980 as a basis for refugee status.' 35 States have generally
ignored the status of economic refugees, who still have not been rec-
ognized by the international community.'3 6
Today, economic refugees, such as some of the Australian boat
people, are not part of the definition of "membership in a social
group" nor part of "persecuted" persons according to the 1951 Con-
vention.13 7 Through evolutionary interpretation, "economic refu-
gees" could be incorporated into the 1951 Convention in the future.
In the opposite vein, a group of people that is now considered to be
part of the Convention could, over time, be excluded through evolu-
tionary interpretation. 38 There is not necessarily a one-way rachet
with evolutionary interpretation. This temporal uncertainty about
which groups could fall within the 1951 Convention only perpetuates
the uncertainty that asylum seekers face today. Currently, asylum
seekers are uncertain whether they will be granted protection. Under
an evolutionary interpretation scheme they will be uncertain whether
they will be protected in the future even if they are protected at pre-
sent. For example, if evolutionary interpretation grants the Australian
boat people protection today, it could take it away in the future, leav-
134 See 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that in specific circumstances,
deprivation of economic opportunity may constitute "persecution" because it would
satisfy the looser interpretation of the word to mean "infliction of suffering or harm
upon those who differ," sufficient to withhold deportation under INA § 243(h) in
order to reflect the sentiment of the 1965 amended version of INA § 243(h)).
135 See Franci S. Gabor & John B. Rosenquest IV, The Unsettled Status of Economic
Refugees from the American and International Legal Perspectives-A Proposal for Recognition
Under Existing International Law, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 275, 279 (2006).
136 See id. at 281.
137 See id. Gabor and Rosenquest outline a proposal through which there could be
protection of economic refugees.
138 Remember, evolutionary interpretation is used by the judges of tribunals in
resolving disputes of interpretation. So, a judge could theoretically read something
out of a treaty just as easily as he had read something into it.
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ing successive generations of asylum seekers perpetually unsure of
their status.
Evolutionary interpretation does not require the two prongs of
customary international law (general state practice and apinio juris)
because it allows for a new interpretation of a treaty, expansive or oth-
erwise.' 39 The theory of evolutionary interpretation is relatively new
and rarely applied.o40 In its limited use, we see that the interpretation
is utilized by a panel ofjudges to determine the meaning and applica-
tion of a treaty in question.14' A treaty such as the 1951 Convention,
which profoundly affects state sovereignty, should not be subject to
the changing and disjointed use of evolutionary interpretation by
domestic and international judges.
The three proposed modalities offer three distinct ways to apply
the 1951 Convention, each with their own merits and disadvantages.
Although evolutionary interpretation provides a compromise, its con-
ciliatory approach should not cloud the serious consequences that
may result from its application. A liberal asylum system should not be
the result of a volatile methodology such as evolutionary interpreta-
tion, whose inherent impermanence renders any temporary improve-
ment unreliable in the future, thus failing to provide the stability most
notably absent from the asylum system.
III. THE CLASSICAL PRINCIPLE: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law, in comparison to evolutionary inter-
pretation, parallels an existing treaty, and if sufficient state practice
and opinio juris are found, may lead to a new treaty on the issue or
even displace a treaty or lack thereof. CIL does not require a long
139 The theory of evolutionary interpretation of treaties has seen limited use. As
such, there are no examples of evolutionary interpretation leading to the contraction
of a treaty. On a theoretical level, however, it is posited that if a concept can be
evolved into a treaty (and not codified by treaty or law) then it can be evolved out as
well. There is no indication that it is a one-way ratchet.
140 There are very rare instances in which evolutionary interpretation has been
used by courts in the past: the Iron Rhine case, the Shrimp-Turtle Case, and Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua. In those cases, the respective treaties were interpreted in order to limitedly
incorporate new technology, new environmental considerations, and new trends in
commerce, respectively. Those applications seem intrinsically different from the
application advocated by some publicists of evolutionary interpretation to the 1951
Convention, both in terms of theoretical and actual repercussions. The current
examples of evolutionary interpretation have been in bilateral disputes. The use of
evolutionary interpretation in the asylum context affects the sanctity of state sover-
eignty and the entire asylum system because of a decision from a court or tribunal.
141 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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practice by states, but only that an established practice exists. 142 Addi-
tionally, there is no requirement for complete uniformity; only sub-
stantial uniformity is required. 1 43  An application of customary
international legal principles is a much stricter and more stable meth-
odology for expanding asylum obligations. Establishing a sufficient
state practice requires the following: (1) the common, "consistent and
concordant" action of numerous states1 44 with a sufficient degree of
participation, especially of those states whose interests are affected by
such action, 14 5 and (2) a failure of other states to challenge or dissent
from an action.146 Although uniform state practice and opinio juris
are difficult to establish in the asylum context,147 perhaps the con-
straints of CIL are appropriate and necessary. CIL is a modality that is
accepted as the classical method for crystallizing new customs as inter-
national law.
The case of The Paquete Habanal4 8 is the leading case on CIL.
There, Justice Gray of the U.S. Supreme Court held that fishing ves-
sels were exempt from prize capture in times of war.149 In arriving at
this decision, he cited historical "tradition" since Henry IV as a basis of
customary international law that satisfied the three requirements of
CIL.150 States-including the United States, France, Great Britain,
Spain, Austria, Germany, and Japan-had been practicing this custom
of exempting fishing vessels because they felt they had a legal obliga-
tion to do so, either by explicit treaty or by action.'5 1 These states
were the major naval powers in the early 1900s, and they had all acqui-
esced to this custom.' 5 2 There was no dissention from this practice,
and any deviation from it resulted in vehement indignation and con-
demnation from other states.15 3
There are customary international norms that can develop within
the asylum context. For example, modern asylum law resulted from
maturing and crystallizing Arab-Islamic and Judeo-Christian tradi-
142 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143 See id.
144 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 63 (June 27).
145 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4,
73 (Feb. 20).
146 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 186.
147 See HATHAWAY, supra note 10.
148 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
149 See id. at 714.
150 See id. at 686-712.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 692.
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tions.15 4 Additionally, the way in which states ignored the temporal
restriction of the definition of "refugee" in the 1951 Convention even
before the 1967 Protocol shows that states are willing to create new
practices and norms within the asylum system.' 55 In a similar vein,
countries that are not party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Proto-
col, such as India and Indonesia, grant and recognize refugee rights
based on the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.15 6 These states,
although not party to the asylum documents, are held to the standards
of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, such as the guarantee of
non-refoulement 5 7 and the provision of temporary and/or permanent
protection. 158
Additionally, the international community is currently expanding
state obligations to asylum seekers via CIL by changing the scope of
the definition of "refugee." Asylum seekers fleeing generalized vio-
lence are another generally accepted kind of "refugee," although that
category is not enumerated in the 1951 Convention. This custom has
arisen due to regional treaties, such as the OAS and the OAU treaties,
which grant refugee status to this category of asylum seekers outside
the realm of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Although
this definition of "refugee" (which includes those fleeing generalized
violence) is not universally recognized and adopted, a substantial
number of states (those that are members of these documents) imple-
ment asylum law under this acceptance of the term "refugee." The
membership of the OAS and the OAU combined constitutes approxi-
mately seventy to eighty countries in the world that have adopted this
definition of "refugee." Arguably, this rises to a level of regional cus-
tom that has been recognized by the International Court of Justice.15 9
154 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 5. The word "tradition" was used by justice
Gray in The Paquete Habana to describe customary international law.
155 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 100-01.
156 See Anil Shrivastav, Need for Domestic: Refugee Law, HALSBURY's L. MONTHLY, Dec.
2008, available at http://www.halsburys.in/need-for-domestic.html.
157 The principle of non-refoulement has risen to the level of a jus cogens norm. See
MUSALO ET AL., supra note 30, at 101 (citing UNHCR, Report of U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, 40 U.N.G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/40/12 at 6 (1985) ("[NJ on-
refoulement has now come to be characterized as a peremptory norm of international
law.")); Cartagena Declaration, supra note 29, art. III ("[Non-refoulement] is imperative
in regard to refugees ... as a rule of jus cogens.").
158 See Shrivastav, supra note 156.
159 The ICJ recognized a regional (Latin American) custom in the Asylum Case of a
state unilaterally characterizing an offense for the purpose of "asylum" if it could
prove it was binding on the states that were parties to the dispute. See Asylum Case
(Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/13/1933.pdf.
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If one also includes the European Union member states that have
accepted that people fleeing high levels of generalized violence
require protection, then that number increases. 160
Asylum cases brought by victims of female genital mutilation
(FGM) also show the willingness of states to expand the refugee defi-
nition. The UNHCR Guidelines on Gender Related Persecutions61 stated
that "[t] here is no doubt that rape and other forms of gender-related
violence, such as dowry-related violence, [and] female genital mutila-
tion ... are acts which inflict severe pain and suffering-both mental
and physical-and which have been used as forms of persecution,
whether perpetrated by state or private actors." 162 The UNHCR's
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV) on Refugee Protec-
tion and Sexual Violence supported the classification of sexual vio-
lence as a "well-founded fear of persecution." 163 South Africa, the
world's most popular destination country for asylum seekers, espe-
cially for African asylum seekers, has codified gender-related violence,
including FGM, within its Refugees Act.16 4 Federal courts in the
United States have recognized victims of FGM and their eligibility for
asylum.165 In Mohammed v. Gonzales,166 the Ninth Circuit held that a
160 SeeCouncil Directive 2004/83/EC, arts. 9(1)-(2), 2004 O.J. (L. 304/12) 12, 15
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4157e75e4.html.
161 See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PER-
SECUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A (2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR
ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7,
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION].
162 Id. 1 9 (internal citation omitted).
163 See UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 102 (2009), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/4b28bflf2.html ("Supports the recognition as refugees of per-
sons whose claim to refugee status is based upon a well-founded fear of persecution,
through sexual violence, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.").
164 See Refugees Act 130 of 1998 § 1 (S. Ar.) ("' [S]ocial group' includes, among
others, a group of persons of particular gender, sexual orientation, disability, class or
caste." (emphasis added)); see also MIGRANT RIGHTS MONITORING PROJECT, GENDER
BASED PERSECUTION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AsyLUM SYSTEM (Special Report No. 3)
41-43 (2008) (asserting that FGM is generally considered a legitimate ground for
asylum).
165 See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol2l/3278.pdf (holding that applicants could seek
asylum on the basis of gender-based persecution, such as female genital mutilation).
In re Kasinga set a precedent in United States immigration law on this issue. Before
this decision, applicants had to use religious or political grounds to show refugee
status.
166 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Barry v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 741, 745 (4th
Cir. 2006) (stating in dictum that a showing of a prior infliction of FGM constitutes a
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showing of FGM was sufficient to establish a "well-founded fear of per-
secution," due to both past violence as well as the risk of future vio-
lence and gender persecution, either to the woman requesting asylum
or to her female children.167 In Canada, asylum cases granting refu-
gee status on the basis of FGM have been decided similarly.' 68 The
United Kingdom, 169 Belgium,o70 France,171 Sweden,17 2 and Ger-
many173 have also granted asylum on the basis of FGM.174
In the development of custom in international law, much weight
is given to the substantial actors in the context of the custom. For
example, in the case of Paquete Habana, the Court only considered the
practice of powerful naval states of the day in determining new cus-
tom. Similarly, in Texaco v. Libya,675 the sole arbitrator, Dupuy,
rejected an assertion of custom because the states that had a substan-
prima facie case of persecution for an asylum claim); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d
1187, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that a prior infliction of FGM is a viable
basis for an asylum claim).
167 See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that
applicants were required only to show that they belonged to an ethnic [social] group
in which girls are mutilated and that their fear of mutilation is well founded). They
are not required to prove that the child was likely to be mutilated, stating that Cardozo-
Foncesca established that a ten percent chance of future persecution was sufficient for
an asylum claim to prevail. See Mohammad, 400 F.3d at 800. The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals rejected this theory in 2008 by asserting that because the "persecution"
(the mutilation) had already occurred and is not likely to happen twice. But see Bah v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the BIA had erred in In re A-T
because it had assumed that a woman could undergo FGM only once).
168 See In re Khadra Hassan Farah, Immigration Review Board (Refugee Division),
May 10, 1994, (Can.) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b70618.
html (holding that an applicant is in the social group of "females" that have a "well-
founded fear of persecution" in the form of female genital mutilation in Somalia).
169 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K [2006] UKHL 46 (appeal
taken from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/46.html.
170 See AMNESTY INT'L, ENDING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A STRATEGY FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS 33 (2010) (citing CCE, No. 29110, June 25, 2009),
available at http://www.endfgm.eu/content/assets/END FGMFINAL.strategy.pdf.
171 See id. (citing Mlle Kinda, CRR, No. 366892, Mar. 19, 2001).
172 See Act on Prohibition of Female Circumcision, 1982:316 (1982) (Swed.).
173 See AMNESIY INT'L, supra note 170 (citing VG Wiesbaden, 5 E 31472/98.A (2),
Jan. 27, 2000; VG Regensburg, RO 5 K 00.30162, Mar. 23, 2000).
174 Some E.U. countries have had shifts in domestic policy recently and are only
granting subsidiary protection to victims of FGM.
175 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The Govern-
ment of the Libyan Arab Republic, Dupuy, Sole Arbitrator, Award on the Merits,
1977, 53 INT'L L. REP. 389, 486 (1979).
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tial interest in the context of the custom (capital exporting states) had
rejected the principles asserted by Libya, a capital importing state.176
As such, although granting refugee status on the basis of FGM is
not wide spread, it should be noted that countries such as South
Africa, the United States, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Swe-
den, and Germany, the main destination countries for asylum seek-
ers,177 have granted refugee status to FGM victims. Therefore this
practice rises to a level of custom de legeferenda, even though it is not a
custom de lege lata (de lege lata is the law as it exists currently;178 de lege
ferenda is Latin for "with a view to the future law"). It is used to
describe developing customary law, such as the acceptance of FGM
victims within the Asylum Convention.
These examples show the willingness of individual states and
regional organizations to expand their obligations within the CIL
framework, which could lead to more widespread acceptance of these
obligations. The practice of granting refugee status and asylum to
those fleeing generalized violence and to women persecuted via geni-
tal mutilation has not risen to the consistency of the fishing vessels
custom in Paquete Habana. Still, the practice of those states that do
grant these groups of people "refugee" status can influence other
states to expand their "refugee" definitions as well. The development
of CIL arises from the influence of states upon others over time. The
tradition in question in Paquete Habana was 500 years in the making,
but the crystallization of customary international law of the Law of the
Sea or of International Environmental Law occurred in less than a
decade. The expansion of the definition of "refugee" to include those
reflected in the OAS and OAU treaties or victims of FGM can cur-
rently be classified as de lege ferenda. Although the expansion of asy-
lum obligations based on CIL would not be immediate and would not
provide a swift solution for the Australian boat people, CIL provides a
more stable and accepted method through which expansion can
occur.
Referring back to the three modalities supplied earlier, the two
main concerns posed were (1) that states should be afforded a margin
176 The capital importing states asserted that the principles reflected in the Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was the custom regarding compensation
for expropriation of foreign property; however this assertion of custom was rejected
because all of the capital exporting states had rejected the Charter. See id. 1 87.
177 See 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 5, at 17. These countries are also most
likely the main destination countries for asylum seekers requesting refugee status on
the basis of FGM.
178 See BLACK'S LAw DicrloNARY 438 (7th ed. 1999); North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 62 (Feb. 20).
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of appreciation in how they implement their asylum obligations, and
(2) that any changes in asylum obligations should be the result of con-
sensus. The CIL framework allows expansion of asylum obligations in
a manner that addresses both of those concerns. General practice of
states does not impose requirements on states, but simply notes how
states actually implement and practice their asylum obligations. Once
this general practice of states based on legal obligations (opinio juis)
becomes prevalent, a new custom is formed. As such, CIL provides a
fourth modality for the expansion of asylum obligations that not only
gives states discretion, but also recognizes and imposes new obliga-
tions that arise as a result of substantial consensus in state practice.
Therefore, through the use of CIL, the liberalization of the asylum
system will be both comprehensive and stable, best addressing the
problems of the current asylum system.
CONCLUSION
The majority of the "boat people" that are housed in detention
camps in Australia are economic refugees or those fleeing generalized
violence from Asia. Although economic refugees will most likely lack
recourse to protest the denial of refugee status, they may claim asylum
on another basis or receive a lesser status, such as temporary protec-
tion. 179 Those fleeing generalized violence have the potential of com-
ing within the scope of "membership in a particular social group or
political opinion" through the principles of custom that continues to
develop. The OAS, AU, and EU member-states already recognize that
these refugees (fleeing generalized violence) need protection.18 0 CIL
addresses the two main concerns in expanding asylum obligations: (1)
allowing states discretion in implementing domestic immigration leg-
islation and (2) requiring a consensus of states before expanding the
asylum system. Evolutionary interpretation, on the other hand, is not
an appropriate solution because it fails in both respects. As a tool of
the international judiciary, evolutionary interpretation imposes obli-
gations on states without their consent and without the consent of the
international community. As such, the theory of evolutionary inter-
pretation of treaties should not be expanded to or used in the asylum
context. Instead, the classical international legal principle of CIL pro-
179 See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990 ("IMMACT"), Pub. L. No. 101-649, (1990)
(establishing a procedure that provides temporary protection to immigrants that (1)
have arrived in the United States, (2) do not qualify for asylum status, and (3) are
temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed
conflict, environmental disaster, or other reason).
180 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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vides a sufficient and appropriate venue for expansion of asylum obli-
gations. Although the CIL methodology will, most likely, not develop
in a sufficiently timely fashion to save the current Australian boat peo-
ple, CIL offers a long-term solution for consistent expansion and liber-
alization of state obligations to asylum seekers.
